Govt missteps; a decade of talks end in doomed domain deal

The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The decision came two months after the controversial agreement was questioned before the Supreme Court, and after the initial TRO had led to renewed fighting between government forces and the MILF. To date, the hostilities have left 102 people dead and displaced 79,855 families.

The failed MOA-AD is only among many of government’s unsuccessful attempts to resolve the Bangsamoro problem.

Every administration since the Marcos regime had engaged Muslim groups in peace talks, hoping to draw up an arrangement that would satisfy both parties. These negotiations resulted in peace agreements and the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

The MOA-AD had proposed the creation of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, the most controversial and contested provision in the agreement. The BJE brings to the fore a territorial dispute that has lasted more than two centuries: the Muslims’ claim to portions of Mindanao and nearby towns which used to be occupied by their ancestors in pre-colonial times.

Eleven years of peace negotiations had led to the crafting of the MOA-AD.

“Ngayon, may giyera. Sayang naman. Labing-isang taong hinubog tapos in just a few days of wrong policy, naitapon lang ang lahat ng pinaghirapan," said Prof. Julkipli Wadi of the University of the Philippines Islamic Studies.

The Bangsamoro struggle

The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report (2005 PHDR), a special issue focusing on peace, human security and development in the country, describes the Bangsamoro problem as “the historical and systematic marginalization and minoritization" of the Moros in their own homeland.

The 2005 PHDR is a publication of the Human Development Network in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme and the New Zealand Agency for International Development.

Soliman Santos, Jr., a peace advocate and human rights lawyer, said in a background paper for the 2005 PHDR that the marginalization and minoritization of the Moros were carried out by Spain in the 16th-19th centuries, by the United States in the first half of the 20th century, and from then onward by Philippine governments “dominated by an elite with a Christian-Western orientation".

Santos, citing an academic paper, mentioned several “foundational causes" of the Bangsamoro problem. The first of these was the annexation of Moroland to the Philippines in the Treaty of Paris in 1898.

Over the years, the imposition of confiscatory land laws and land grabbing contributed to the marginalization of Muslims in their own homeland. Past government policies which encouraged an influx of settlers from Luzon and Visayas to the resource-rich island further aggravated the situation.

Santos’ paper also cited the violence committed against Muslims during the Marcos administration as among the more recent root causes of the Bangsamoro problem.

A particularly bitter episode was the Jabidah massacre on March 18, 1968. “Jabidah" was the name of the unit of some young Muslims who were recruited to undergo military training in Corregidor.

Few records and details are available on the Jabidah massacre, but accounts from Muslim advocacy groups say the recruits were brought to the island early that year, not knowing the real nature of their mission. Apparently, the Marcos administration intended to use them in wresting control of Sabah from Malaysia.

Upon learning the real reason behind their training, the recruits refused to take part in the top secret plan. Carrying it out would mean pitting themselves against fellow Muslims; they also had relatives there, who would be affected in the ensuing chaos.

Not wanting their bungled plan to leak out, the military executed the Muslim recruits. The number of those killed varies, from more than 20 to more than a hundred.

In a phone interview with GMA News Research, Prof. Wadi recalls that no less than Sen. Benigno “Ninoy" Aquino Jr. investigated the incident. “There were extensive Congressional hearings on the incident," Wadi said.

The book “Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao" by Marites Dañguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria said eight officers and 16 enlisted men were court martialled, but these men were eventually cleared in 1971.

“This was during the Marcos administration, which wielded considerable influence… plus it involves the military, na mahirap imbestigahan… ang end result, after everything was said and done, namatay rin lang ang kaso," Wadi added.

Santos wrote that the Jabidah massacre “became the defining moment to mark the start of the contemporary Moro armed struggle." The Muslim group Moro National Liberation Front considers the date of the massacre as the date of the organization’s founding and commemorates March 18 every year as the “Bangsamoro National Freedom Day."

Aside from the Jabidah massacre, Santos traced the root cause of the contemporary Bangsamoro problem to other instances of violence against Muslims during the Marcos administration. There were the attacks carried out by Christian vigilante groups and some military units which terrorized Muslim communities in Mindanao in the early 1970s. The most notorious of the vigilante groups, the Ilagas, mutilated their victims; they were also behind the killing of around 70 Muslims inside a mosque in Manili, North Cotabato, in 1971.

The Ilaga and military atrocities drew attention from the international media and, consequently, concern from Muslim world leaders. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), in a resolution during the 3rd Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1972, expressed “serious concern over the plight of Muslims living in the Philippines".

In the same year, President Marcos declared Martial Law using the violence in Mindanao as one of his justifications.

The MNLF emerged soon after to lead a rebellion, launching counteroffensives against the military. Santos’ paper described the war in 1973-1974 as “the bloodiest fighting in the Philippines since World War II", which reached its peak in 1975.
 

the road to Muslim autonomy

Amid intense fighting in Mindanao and the consequent pressure from the international community, the Marcos administration embarked on peace negotiations with the MNLF.

In 1976, the government entered into the Tripoli Agreement with the MNLF to establish Muslim autonomy in the Southern Philippines.

“The MNLF battle cry was the right to self-determination and an independent “Bangsa Moro" (Moro Nation)," explained Amina Rasul in briefing papers on the Mindanao autonomy. Rasul is lead convenor of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy.

“With this [Tripoli] agreement, the original aim of independence was reduced to a quest for autonomy – possession of the right to self-determination but within the framework and territorial integrity of the Philippines," she said.

In March 1977, President Marcos issued Proclamation 1628 declaring autonomy in the Southern Philippines. A plebiscite was conducted the following month in the 13 provinces proposed for inclusion in the area of autonomy: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato and Palawan.

The MNLF rejected the plebiscite, saying it was a unilateral move by the Marcos administration.

“The Marcos government violated the terms of the accord by holding a plebiscite for the provinces and asking them if they would want to be part of the autonomous Mindanao identified in the Tripoli Agreement," wrote Rasul. “This made autonomy conditional instead of automatic."

The bid for autonomy failed: the provinces voted to remain in the existing Western and Central Mindanao regions rather than join the autonomous government. Hostilities between government forces and the MNLF continued.

The Bangsamoro quest gained ground when EDSA I toppled Marcos. The resumption of talks with MNLF was among President Cory Aquino’s earliest directives. She personally met with MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari in September 1986 to start the peace talks. Negotiations resumed and resulted in the Jeddah Accord in 1987, which considered the possibility of granting full autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan.

The Jeddah Accord was superseded by the 1987 Constitution. The new constitution included provisions for the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

ARMM was created in 1989 by virtue of Republic Act 6734 (Organic Act for the ARMM).

For the second time, the 13 provinces proposed for inclusion in the area of autonomy were asked to decide in a plebiscite whether they wanted to join the area of autonomy or not.

Only four provinces joined ARMM: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.

Rasul noted that this was again a unilateral move on the part of the government. “The MNLF as the representative of the Bangsa Moro was not party to the creation of the Organic Act, nor to the plebiscite," she wrote.

“Thus, while not a full-scale war, the conflict in Mindanao continued after “autonomy" was formally granted in Muslim Mindanao. It was autonomy without the consent and participation of the MNLF, and it was an autonomy that can be characterized as an imposition of the vision of one party – the Philippine government -- over the other – the Moros (Filipino Muslims) represented by the MNLF. It was not the autonomy negotiated by both parties in the Tripoli agreement," Rasul noted.

“the final peace agreement"

Unsatisfied with the outcome of negotiations with the Aquino administration, the MNLF took interest in the Ramos administration’s offer: to sit down anew and discuss the unimplemented provisions of the Tripoli Agreement. This led to the signing of the Final Peace Agreement in 1996.

The Final Peace Agreement covered two phases. The first phase involved the creation of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly. The three-year period allotted for this phase would also entail the integration of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.

Phase two of the agreement involved amendments to RA 6734 and the conduct of a plebiscite to determine the establishment of an expanded ARMM.

“The creation of the SPCPD was aimed at coordinating developments in SZOPAD, in order to lay the foundations of autonomy in Mindanao," Rasul wrote. But the SPCPD’s powers were very limited and not clearly defined; by Rasul’s assessment, it failed to meet its objective.   

“Instead of fostering development, the SPCPD, SZOPAD, and the Assembly became just another layer in the bureaucracy," Rasul said.

The implementation of Phase 2 came about two administrations later, during the term of President Arroyo.

RA 6734 was amended into RA 9054 in 2001. The new law provided for the expansion of ARMM to other provinces and cities and was subject to a plebiscite within the same year.

When the results came in, only Basilan and Marawi City voted for inclusion in ARMM from a possible field of 15 provinces and 13 cities.

Another province – Shariff Kabunsuan – became the sixth province to make up ARMM after the regional government carved it out of Maguindanao in 2006.

The Supreme Court, however, recently voided the province’s creation, as well as the provision in the RA 9054 which granted the ARMM government the power to create new provinces and cities. The Supreme Court held that only the Congress has this power. The ruling is not yet final.

the rise of the MILF

Neither the peace agreements with MNLF nor the creation and expansion of ARMM settled the grievances of the Bangsamoro.

It became even more complicated with the emergence of factions among Muslim leaders.

According to Santos’ background paper, the failure of negotiations on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in 1977 led to some frustration, differences of opinion, and an eventual split in the MNLF.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) declared itself as a separate organization from MNLF in 1984.

The 2005 PHDR observes that “the MILF’s tendency is to exit or separate/secede from the Philippine system rather than to access or share power in it."  Santos noted that the MILF’s maximum objective is an independent Islamic state.

“But this… is not presented as its position in the talks (as the GRP would clearly not negotiate on this as a starting point)," Santos wrote.

The MILF has been participating in peace talks since the Ramos administration. It refused to recognize the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement. Neither did it recognize ARMM. In an official statement released in May 2008, the group reiterated its consistent policy of “non-recognition and non-participation" in any electoral process undertaken by the Philippine government.

“The integration of the Bangsamoro homeland during the Treaty of Paris in 1898 was very arbitrary. Walang plebiscite-plebiscite," UP Prof. Wadi said. In contrast, the areas proposed for inclusion in the BJE would not have been automatically included; these areas would still have been subjected to a plebiscite, where they can opt to stay in or out of the BJE. “Pero dahil hindi transparent ang naging proseso, nagulat ang tao, akala automatic. Takot ang nangunguna," Wadi explained.

The government dissolved last month the government panel in the peace talks with the MILF. And now that the MOA-AD has been declared unconstitutional, the Bangsamoro problem is nowhere near a meaningful resolution.

“It will take national leadership and a higher sense of statesmanship to resolve the current problem," said Wadi. “Mukhang walang makikitang kaliwanagan ang isyu hanggang matapos ang termino ng kasalukuyang administrasyon. The next administration might end up shouldering the same problem."