Filtered By: Topstories
News

After the Massacre: Dureza describes his encounter with the Ampatuans


Secretary Jesus Dureza is President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's adviser on Mindanao affairs, and was sent by Malacañang as point-man to crisis-manage the brewing troubles in Maguindanao following the November 23 Ampatuan massacre. Secretary Dureza has handled many other crisis situations in the past. GMANews.TV is posting Dureza's gripping first-hand account of the critical four-day aftermath of the massacre, leading to the surrender of Ampatuan town mayor Datu Andal "Unsay" Ampatuan Jr. as prime suspect in the mass killing. We have retained his account almost word for word, so as to preserve the sense of urgency and down-to-earth colors of the event, inserting only short parenthetical material in brackets to help identify key personalities and agencies that Dureza typically mentions in acronym or nickname form.

- JV,GMANews.TV

MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE: THE FOUR CRITICAL DAYS (A recollection of those four critical days ) By SECRETARY JESUS G. DUREZA
DAY ONE – Monday Nov 23 I was monitoring closely reports about a missing convoy in Maguindanao with media friends. Later in the day, reports of mass murder of the Mangudadatus were confirmed. Allegedly by Datu Unsay Ampatuan Jr. et al. My instincts told me this could well be a very explosive situation. When media called, I said I would recommend proclaiming a state of emergency. At 8 p.m. SND Bert [Secretary of National Defense, Norberto] Gonzales and I met. He told me the President had directed that I act as “crisis manager." DAY TWO – Tuesday Nov 24 Bert and I took the earliest flight to Gen. Santos City. At the 601st Brigade [headquarters] in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, briefings were held. Initial photos of the carnage were flashed on the screen. Gruesome! Next we met with the Mangudadatus, many of them my personal friends. They were tense and angry. They wanted to retrieve the bodies immediately. They demanded justice, immediately. The Ampatuans did it, they said. After Bert and I expressed government’s resolve to do everything possible, Toto Mangudadatu said they will cooperate. No retaliatory action, but government must give justice. 12 noon – A teleconferencing call connected Bert and me to the Palace where the President was presiding over a hastily-called security meeting. We were getting specific instructions from her. So did Bert, PNP Chief Jess [Philippine National Police chief, Director General Jesus] Verzosa and AFP Vice CS [Armed Forces of the Philippines vice chief of staff, Rodrigo] Maclang who arrived with us. Her voice had that sense of urgency. Inputs from the other cabinet members were also relayed. 1:00 PM – The crisis management committee was activated. Assisting me were Eastmincom Gen. [Eastern Mindanao Command chief, Lt. General Raymundo B.] Ferrer and PNP 12 Director [Police Chief Superintendent Felizardo] Serapio. 2:00 PM – Bert left to fly back to Manila. Col. [Medardo] Geslani, 601st Brigade commander assisted in setting up the command center. It was at this time that I operationalized an action plan I had quietly formulated in my mind. It was a simple plan drawing lessons from past experiences. 3:00 PM – Having talked with the Mangudadatus, I decided to go see the Ampatuans in Shariff Aguak. I felt confident. Both families were my friends. And I had direct access to them. With my staff and without military escorts, except for one military officer, Col. Macario as guide, I motored to the Ampatuan residence. 3:45 PM – I entered the Ampatuan fenced premises, and the patriarch Gov. Andal Ampatuan Sr. was there waiting for me. With him seated in a bahay kubo on the sprawling grounds were several ARMM and Maguindanao officials and relatives. Armed followers were everywhere. After informing Gov. Andal that my purpose in coming was because of the incident and that his son, Mayor [Datu Andal] "Datu Unsay" Ampatuan Jr. was implicated, I told “Bapa" Andal that it would be best that the Ampatuans also “cooperate." I said that Datu Unsay should submit to an investigation. He immediately said, “OK. Kausapin mo sya. Ipatawag ko si Datu Unsay. Basta kayo, Secretary, walang problema (OK. You talk to him. I will call for Datu Unsay. No problem, Secretary, so long as you're the man)." I told him I wanted to see Datu Unsay as I got reports that he was missing or had escaped. Bapa said: “Hindi yan totoo. Darating si Datu Unsay. Magpakita sya sa’yo Secretary (That's not true. Datu Unsay will be here. He'll show himself to you, Secretary)." Bapa Andal, as usual, was a man of few words. We then went inside the house to wait for the son’s arrival. In the meantime, ARMM [Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao] Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan and Cong. Digs [Congressman Didagen] Dilangalen arrived from the airport. Usec. Zam [Undersecretary Zamzamin] Ampatuan, Atty. Cynthia Guiani Sayadi, among others were there too. I felt a bit tense and uncomfortable. I did not want to start talking about the incident until Unsay would arrive. We were chatting for about an hour, trying to divert the issue and loosen up. A lively conversation centered on how many children some of their relatives had. One relative had 70 children – of course from several mothers. Etc. 4:30 PM – We waited. I noticed that Atty. Cynthia was using her cellphone and taking pictures while we were chatting. Unsay arrived and got seated on my left. We continued a bit about our light banter until Unsay settled down. (GMA7 later that same evening showed some pictures on TV. My wife Beth texted me and called my attention immediately when she saw it: “Bakit ka smile kasama mga Ampatuan (Why do you smile with Ampatuans). Not proper." I agreed. But I was puzzled where the pictures came from and who sent them. There were no media people around. I surmised Cynthia did it.) 5:00 PM – I was becoming worried that darkness would overtake my return trip to Sultan Kudarat. Many armed and uniformed men on the highway. One could not tell what group or unit. So when Unsay got seated, I immediately told him that I came because of the serious incident and that initial reports mentioned his name as involved. I told him my purpose in coming was only to be assured that he would cooperate and submit himself to any investigation. He looked at the direction of Gov. Andal who spoke first: “Gaya ng sinabi ko sa’yo kanina, magcooperate kami, Secretary (Like what I told you a while ago, Secretary, we will cooperate)." Then Unsay himself echoed this, saying: “Mag-cooperate po kami (We will cooperate, sir), Secretary." I then stood up and said I would contact them again soon. We arrived in Marbel [older name of Koronadal] already dark and stayed there for the night.
next page
DAY THREE – Wednesday Nov 25 8:30 AM – I visited a funeral parlor in Marbel. Some bodies not identified yet. I then directed DSWD 12 [Department of Social Welfare and Development, Region 12] to attend to the immediate needs of the families, and that DOH [Department of Health] 12 and OCD [Office of Civil Defense] 12 were to assist. I motored to Tacurong at 601st Brigade and met the NBI [National Bureau of Investigation] team that just arrived from Manila. I reconvened the crisis committee and mapped up moves on how to fast-track work. A team of PNP investigators were sent to the residence of Buluan Vice Mayor Toto Mangudadatu to get statements but they were told that affidavits of their witnesses would be submitted instead, perhaps the following day. I was already aware that the outrage over the killings was mounting. And government was being criticized for slow action. 12 noon – Over lunch at the brigade, I consulted with the crisis committee on my plan: it was time to contact the Ampatuans and call in Datu Unsay to voluntarily surrender. As they committed to me yesterday. I was also quietly informed that an operational plan was underway to forcibly take custody of him. 2:00 PM – On my way to Marbel to dialogue with all the families of the victims, I made several calls. First with ARMM Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan. I told him it was time to bring in Datu Unsay. He told me he would consult the father, Gov. Andal. I said I had only until 5 PM that day to work on this plan. After 5 PM, the scenario would no longer be the same, I told him. 4:00 PM – While meeting the families of victims in downtown Marbel, I got a call from the father, Gov. Andal telling me that he would turn over to me Datu Unsay but requested that the deadline be moved from 5 PM today to 10 AM the following day. I immediately told him I could not guarantee things if the deadline was moved. He said the Ampatuan clan would meet that evening and discuss things and bid goodbye to Datu Unsay. I told him I would get back to him by phone. I made calls and informed some of my colleagues (with whom I had been consulting from the beginning) of the request. There were objections. Understandable reservations: what if the extension was a ruse to escape that evening? What were the guarantees that he would voluntarily surrender during the new deadline? People were becoming outraged not only about the crime but about the perceived slowness of government, so why waste more time? The forces were ready to strike, so why delay? But I also reasoned back: How sure are we that we would get Datu Unsay in the operations? (From yesterday’s visit to the Ampatuans, I was certain that he was not there in the immediate vicinity but came from somewhere far.) An assault would surely cost lives knowing the armaments, the culture and the situation. People were crying for swift action but I would not agree to precipitate action. I also said I believed Gov. Andal was sincere when he told me he would bring out his son when needed. To wrap up my point, I said: I would take full responsibility for whatever outcome. My new timeline was adopted. I moved the deadline to 10:00 AM the following day. That night, we reviewed the “pickup" scenario several times and mapped out contingencies just in case things would not go as planned. In the meantime, government troops moved according to operational plans. That evening, I got a call from Atty. Cynthia getting an assurance from me that nothing would be launched that evening until the 10 AM pickup time the following day. I told her if there were troop movements, these were in support of the 10 AM “pickup." Later in the night, another complication suddenly arose. Gen. [Region 12 Police chief] Serapio and Col. Geslani informed me that they got information that Toto Mangudadatu would motor with his followers to file his certificate of candidacy the following morning in Shariff Aguak. I immediately called Gov. Teng [Sultan Kudarat governor Suharto] Mangudadatu. I told him that there was something afoot the following morning and that without disclosing what it was all about, I requested if he could convince Toto to move his filing to another day. A few minutes later, Gov. Teng called and said the clan agreed.
previous page
next page
DAY FOUR – Thursday Nov 26 6:00 AM – Early morning, government forces took over and occupied the ARMM facilities and other buildings and premises in Maguindanao province. Armed elements loyal to the Ampatuans were taken by surprise and gave up their firearms without resistance. I was nervous a bit but confident. The “what-if" scenarios kept popping up in my mind. I motored to the 601st Brigade for the final briefings. The choppers would pick me up from there. Gen. Ferrer and I watched as more newly arrived troops were jumping off towards designated areas. 9:00 AM – I was informed that something went wrong with the Huey helicopters coming from Cotabato. The Davao choppers were instead dispatched but would not be able to arrive by 10 AM. 9:55 AM – I got a call from Col. Geslani whom we tasked to liaison with the Ampatuans that they were requesting for a little time as they were waiting for their lawyer, who was still on the road, to arrive. That was a break I needed. The two choppers arrived. We discussed with the pilot and crew contingencies and procedures. 10:45 AM – We were ready to jump off on cue from Col. Geslani. It would be a short 35-minute hop from the brigade to Shariff Aguak. My staff Cecil said she’s getting nervous but insisted on joining. My assistant Yo was busy texting. But wait, another problem suddenly cropped up. As we were boarding, the two PNP officers tasked to escort the suspect said they could not use the handcuff on Ampatuan as the KEY WAS MISSING! “What about the other handcuff with your buddy," I asked. “Ganon din po (Same problem), sir,", he replied. “Sh_t!" I almost fell from my seat! “Sarap sapakin!" (I'd love to bash your faces in!) But there was no more time. We then agreed that Ampatuan would be strapped with the seatbelt and the policemen would firmly clasp the buckles to prevent any unexpected situation while airborne. (When I was asked later by reporters why Ampatuan was not handcuffed, I had a ready curt answer with a straight face: “He is adequately restrained!" Sec. Agnes [Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera] promptly responded with the same line when she was asked upon landing in Manila. ) 11:20 AM – Two Hueys landed on the Maguindanao province capitol grounds. The Huey engines were not shut off as agreed upon, in case a sudden exit maneuver was necessary. I waited for 20 minutes on the ground. I was getting worried. Finally, I saw my staff Ollie with his thumbs-up sign. Col. Geslani signalled, they were on their way. My “what-if" scare disappeared. The capitol gates opened. The Ampatuan family arrived on board vehicles from another location nearby. Gov. Zaldy, clasping my hand, said: “Ipaubaya ni Amah si Datu Unsay sa ‘yo (Father is entrusting Datu Unsay to you)" and turned over Datu Unsay to me. We boarded the aircraft with Atty. Cynthia, insisting she had to ride with him. 11:40 AM – Helis took off en route to Gen. Santos City where Sec. Agnes and her crew were waiting for an inquest proceeding. But again something happened. About a few minutes airborne and while still climbing and gaining altitude, I first noticed some flapping sound outside. I thought, maybe some loose parts of the chopper. The noise kept coming, intermittent. I looked down and maybe I saw flashes but I was not sure. Suddenly, the Huey banked sharply to the right and simultaneously, several short bursts from our two Huey gunners at the back. The bursts startled all of us. The evasive maneuver by the pilot also jarred us. All of us kept our heads low as the Huey steeply climbed. My staff Jerry and Col. Mac, who were seated beside the open Huey doors, ducked. The soldier at the back shouted, “Ground fire, sir." We still climbed. The flapping sound from outside could not be heard anymore. The gunners later told me ground fire sounded like flapping from the air. The evasive action and the machine-gun bursts were SOP. At 2,000 feet altitude, we cruised. That’s when I saw on the Huey floor an empty shell from the bursts of the M60 machine gun on board. I picked up the empty shell, then pocketed it for good luck. At the Gensan airport, I called the Boss: “Mission accomplished, Mrs. President."
previous page
LOADING CONTENT