This is part one in a two-part series on private armies and the challenge that faced the Arroyo-appointed Zeñarosa Commission. A few days after the most gruesome political killing in modern Philippine history claimed 58 lives, a joint military-police team unearthed at least two big weapons caches in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao: one buried in a vacant lot near the mansion of the Ampatuans, now accused as perpetrators of the November 23 carnage, and another right inside the home of the primary suspect, Andal Ampatuan Jr. The hidden arsenals yielded 13 high-powered rifles and machine guns, 11 hand guns, and eight light artillery pieces, as well as 140 boxes of M16 ammunition, many of them with “Department of National Defense" markings. Although the seized weaponry could only arm at most an undersized Army company — not a battalion or brigade as earlier reports claimed — authorities said the firearms were only a fraction of many more weapons in the hands of the powerful clan’s private militia. The Nov. 23 massacre and the backlash on the Ampatuans opened a Pandora’s box of questions: How could a political clan maintain a private army so openly, under the very eyes of the AFP and PNP? How could the country’s President then (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo), whose closest allies in Mindanao included the Ampatuans, not have noticed? Even if the Ampatuans rotted in jail and their private army dismantled, won’t another massacre happen again in some other place? On December 8, four days after the raid, then President Arroyo appeared to come up with answers, or at least with a mechanism that could provide some answers. Mrs. Arroyo issued Administrative Order 275 creating the Independent Commission Against Private Armies (ICAPA), which would recommend measures to disband private armed groups (PAGs) not just in Maguindanao, but in the entire country. The ICAPA, or the better known as the Zeñarosa Commission, finished its work by June 30 and submitted its report to both outgoing President Arroyo and new President Noynoy Aquino. The new administration has neither revealed the Commission's findings nor commented on its recommendations, including "the abolition of a policy granting amnesties to wielders of loose firearms." But the Aquino administration has hinted that private militias are still useful for securing many rural areas. Thus it may be back to square one in the ambitious goal of abolishing officially sanctioned private armies, or any one of the names they go by - Cafgus, CVOs, barangay tanods, etc.
A short history of the Zeñarosa Commission The commission, headed by Court of Appeals Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa, had the following as panel members:
- Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption;
- Herman Basbaño, president of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas;
- retired Brig. Gen. Jaime Echevarria of the Association of Generals and Flag Officers (who died in February and was replaced by retired Lt. Gen. Edilberto Adan)
- retired police deputy director Virtus Gil;
- Butuan Catholic Bishop Juan de Dios Pueblos; and
- Mahmod Mala Adilao of the Bishop Ulama Conference.
AO 275 gave the ICAPA until May 2010 to submit its recommendations. Whatever findings and proposals the ICAPA came up with were too late to have had any substantial impact on the May 2010 elections. If taken seriously, however, its output could still be a valuable resource for the succeeding President’s political reform program.
ICAPA asks for extension As it turned out, below much of the media's radar, the ICAPA worked for the next six months until June 30, the day Mrs. Arroyo bowed out of office and newly-elected President Benigno Aquino III assumed the presidency. The body, dubbed by media the Zeñarosa Commission, quickly set up its support staff and team of lawyers in early January, agreeing to meet every other day. A member of the ICAPA, Dante Jimenez of VACC, told GMANews.TV in January that the panel expected to identify the PAGs and their principals and have them charged in court by the end of March. "Once we have investigated, they will be ready for prosecution. Then, we can come out with the names," Jimenez had cheerfully said. Other political analysts were not as optimistic. Romulo Tuazon of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) and Joel Rocamora of the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD), both non-government public policy institutes, doubted that the commission could finish its work on time — if at all. On March 24, Justice Zeñarosa, perhaps worried about a three-month timetable, asked for an extension. In fact, she asked that the commission be made permanent. "We… see the need of extending the term of our existence, because after the elections, that is when most problems would come in," said Zeñarosa, adding that the body will ask the incoming administration “to make this commission a permanent thing." (See:
Commission vs private armies wants mandate extended beyond Arroyo term) Nevertheless, as the electoral campaign heated up, the commissioners involved themselves with ground-level efforts of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) against the effect of PAGs and loose firearms on the forthcoming May elections. Oddly enough, this practical focus on the threat of election violence led the commission to inspect the AFP and PNP’s own unkempt backlots, so to speak. In Resolutions 001-10 and 002-10, the commission asked the AFP and PNP to conduct inventories of weapons issued to their respective jurisdictions: Citizens Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) and CAFGU Active Auxiliaries (CAA) for the AFP, and provincial jail guards, provincial security forces, Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs), Police Auxiliary Units (PAUs), and barangay tanods for the PNP.
Traditional private armies The Commission's queries about the deployment of government weapons to local militias could only lead to what terrorized communities have known long before the November 23 massacre: the open, logistical support many private armed groups have received from the government. The Ampatuans' armed followers, dozens of whom are suspected of taking part in the massacre in the clan's bailiwick, are now only the most notorious private army affiliated with elected local officials. But this murderous relationship between political warlords and private militias has a long history. From the
Saka-saka (literally, “barefoot") of Ilocos, the
Bungutan (“bearded ones") of Cebu down to the Christian
Ilagas (“rats") and Moro
Pusa (“cats") of southern Mindanao, these small but terrible armies of goons, bodyguards and assassins became laws unto themselves, helping clans keep their rural fiefdoms and extend their power to urban or even national posts through terror, violence and plunder. A study by CenPEG released in January this year showed the connection between private armies and electoral violence before 1972. According to the study, election-related killings involving private armies rose from 24 in 1959, to 128 in 1967, to 225 in 1971. The image of an entire village torched to the ground by goons in Bantay, Ilocos Sur was etched in the public mind. Already, a national clamor called for a mailed-fist response. When the late strongman Ferdinand Marcos imposed his martial-law regime from 1972 onwards, he dismantled many of these PAGs. Under Marcos, the AFP declared that it had disbanded some 145 private armies in the 1970s, recovering over 100,000 firearms in the process. In a supreme twist of irony, however, Marcos soon turned the AFP, including the newly-integrated national police, into what many of his critics decried as a giant private army that served his clique’s interests: from suppressing dissent in the streets and barrios, to jailing or even killing opposition leaders, to keeping its wealth safe and sound. The AFP meanwhile extended its reach by maintaining paramilitary forces at the village level. First called Barrio Self-Defense Units (BSDU) in 1960s, then Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) in the 1970s and 1980s, these local militia units were used as “force multipliers" against the communist-led and Moro separatist insurgencies. A few AFP field commanders went even beyond, coddling armed cults and anti-communist vigilantes with blood-curdling practices such as the Tadtad and Alsa Masa. Under the aegis of a Marcos-loyalist AFP, these armed groups shared the blame for many human rights abuses against political dissenters and suspected rebel-controlled communities.
CAFGU as AFP extension The 1987 Constitution, adopted by Mrs. Corazon Aquino a year after she assumed power, prohibited private militias: "Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled." (Article XVIII, Section 24) At the same time, the AFP was to be “composed of a citizen armed force." (Article XVI, Section 4) This led to the idea of creating AFP geographical units in the localities that differed from the old BSDU and CHDF. Mrs. Aquino’s EO 264 issued in July 1987 thus created the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs), which were solidly placed under the AFP chain of command. The most active of these paramilitary units, called CAFGU Active Auxiliaries (CAAs), provided vital support in the counter-insurgency campaign. Armed with high-powered M16s and M14s, they joined AFP operations in the familiar terrain of their own hometowns and villages. CAFGUs grew from around 37,000 in 1988 to an all-time peak of 75,000 in 1992. In 1998, the AFP announced that the insurgency’s backbone has been broken and that the CAFGUs were to be disbanded. Under Mrs. Arroyo’s presidency, however, CAFGUs expanded and remained at least 50,000-strong from 2002 onwards, according to Rommel C. Banlaoi’s “CAFGUs, CVOs, and the Maguindanao Massacre" published by the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research (www.pipvtr.com) in December 2009. The CAFGUs, as the village frontliners against insurgents, were deployed in 13,400 villages. Interestingly, however, the Banlaoi paper presented a skewed distribution, with “around 70% of CAFGU units… organized in Central Mindanao while the remaining 30% are deployed in other priority areas of the country." “Having been deployed in local areas, the CAFGU has been associated with local private armies because local politicians endorse most of its members," the paper said. Special CAFGUs, in particular, show how government militia could easily turn private. In 1989, according to a Human Rights Watch report, the government instituted a Special CAFGU program that “allowed businesses to enter into memorandums of understanding with the armed forces to effectively employ CAFGUs as armed security guards." In 2004, the program was expanded to also allow LGUs to similarly fund and employ CAFGUs. In a 2008 Newsbreak article, Gemma Bagayaua explained how the allowances and firearms of Special CAFGU units are “typically covered" by the LGU or firm that requested them, unlike regular CAFGUs who rely on the AFP budget. “Inevitably, the special units become private armies for the politicians or businesses that fund them," the Newsbreak article said.
CVOs as PNP extension In the same year that Mrs. Aquino enabled CAFGUs, she also issued EO 309 creating “civilian volunteer organizations" (CVOs). More commonly known as
barangay tanod (village sentries) and later
Bantay Bayan (people’s guards), the government saw CVOs as a “community-based mechanism" to support local government and local police efforts against criminality and lawlessness. According to the Banlaoi paper, the DILG currently estimates “a total of around 800,000 CVOs nationwide," organized in all 79 provinces of the country. In 1993, then President Fidel Ramos issued
AO 81 which admitted that some officials “utilize numerous AFP, PNP or civilian bodyguards, as security personnel." The AFP and PNP were ordered to go against PAGs, and to “immediately deactivate those [CAFGUs and CVOs] which are no longer needed for counter-insurgency operations." In July 2006, however, Mrs. Arroyo issued EO 546 which enjoined the PNP to more actively support AFP operations against insurgencies. To this end, police and local officials were directed to deputize CVOs in areas where insurgents operated. The deputized CVOs, called “police auxiliary units" (PAUs), are supposed to remain unarmed. But there have been cases of CVOs issued arms for counter-insurgency or politicians’ security needs. Thus, the growth of CAFGUs and CVOs began to be seen by human rights groups as the renewed growth of private armies in disguised form.
—HS, GMANews.TV 
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