Despite massacre, private armies may be here to stay

After 57 people were gunned down execution style one year ago in the worst case of political violence in the nation’s history, the government vowed to crack down on private armies. It created a high-level commission to devise a plan. That body has completed its work and submitted its recommendations, one year has passed since the November 23 massacre, and the government has cracked down on exactly one private army: the one belonging to the Ampatuan clan, the same one accused of masterminding and perpetrating the massacre. But even the Ampatuans have not been completely de-fanged, as hundreds of their armed followers continue to roam Maguindanao, according to the provincial governor Toto Mangudadatu, whose late wife and sisters led the ill-fated convoy on November 23, 2009. The Zeñarosa Commission, appointed last year by then President Gloria Arroyo to recommend ways to dismantle private armies, submitted its findings to the Aquino administration soon after it assumed power. But the report has not been made public. While President Aquino has shown some interest in the Ampatuan trial, he has not issued orders to pursue any of the dozens of private armies that have long been a hallmark of the country’s provincial politics, despite a campaign promise to do so. However, any public discussions about the issue have been muddled by confusion about what exactly constitutes a private army, or in the parlance of the military, Private Armed Groups (PAGs). Human rights advocates tend to call a private army any armed groups not officially part of the police or military. The government’s view does not count auxiliary forces like Cafgus that often aid Army troops and law enforcers in many rural areas. "Force multipliers" During the presidential campaign last April, Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth informally asked then candidate Aquino “whether his vow to rid the country of private armies meant that he was going to end reliance on civilian volunteer organizations and police auxiliary units, which were the actual paramilitary units that were used in the Maguindanao massacre." (See: Int’l group: Noynoy, Villar ‘not firm’ vs. private armies) According to Roth, Aquino said no, “because these paramilitary units are all force multipliers in his view." A day later, Aquino’s camp quickly clarified that the chat with Roth happened “while going down the elevator" and thus could not adequately reflect the presidential candidate’s complete views on the issue. During Aquino’s first week in office, when the issue was raised again, presidential spokesman Edwin Lacierda told media that the President has the political will to crush private armies before his term ends. But he offered no practical measures, only generalities. “The president’s policy is to abolish private armies," Lacierda said. “It's abhorrent to law enforcement. We cannot have an army dedicated to one politician to the detriment of the enforcement of the law by the appropriate enforcement agencies." (See: Aquino has ‘political will’ to crush private armies — spokesman) Communications Secretary Ricky Carandang, for his part, said President Aquino is not in favor of banning paramilitary groups altogether. In a Nov. 17 interview on ANC, Carandang said a blanket ban might affect the country's "defense posture." Zeñarosa Commission recommendations In a recent interview, Zeñarosa Commission member retired general Edilberto Adan said he and his fellow commissioners did their job. But he hastened to add, "The commission is not the dismantler" of private armed groups, or PAGs, since that is the job of law enforcers. "We went to these areas and listened to local officials, non-government organizations. We invited those who wanted to report something and that is how we were able to establish the existence of some groups. We talked to victims of harassment, victims whose relatives by maintainers or patrons of private armies," Adan said. He said the Commission submitted its report to both outgoing President Arroyo and incoming President Aquino. While he said he was not authorized to release the report, he did reveal its three main recommendations:

• the creation of a permanent anti-PAG task force, which Adan said was implemented;
• the crafting of a law imposing stiffer penalties on the maintenance of PAGs; and
• the abolition of a policy granting amnesties to wielders of loose firearms.

As Aquino’s first 100 days wore on, the Palace kept unusually quiet on the Zeñarosa recommendations — in contrast to its fast and focused response after the August 23 hostage-taking tragedy. Justice Sec. Leila de Lima said the Zeñarosa Commission’s report is still under review by the Executive branch. "The President has a standing directive to review the report of the Zeñarosa Commission. [The review consists of determining] which of the recommendations are worth adopting and feasible at this point," she said. De Lima said, however, that she agrees with the first recommendation of creating a permanent task force. Fluctuating numbers of private armies Citing PNP records, Adan said that there were a total of 107 PAGs nationwide when the commission wrapped up its probe on June 30 of this year. He declined to name the clans maintaining them because "this information has not been validated yet." Adan only hinted that these groups are concentrated in the following areas notorious as election hot spots: the provinces of Masbate, Lanao del Sur, and Abra, and the regions of Zamboanga and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), of which Maguindanao is part. In December 2009, then Defense Secretary Norberto Gonzales estimated at least 132 private armed groups led by politicians in various parts of the country, mostly in Mindanao, with a combined strength of around 10,000 armed men. He likewise did not identify the political clans. (See: 132 private armed groups exist nationwide - DND chief) When the Independent Commission Against Private Armies (ICAPA), or the Zeñarosa Commission, started its work in January 2010, then PNP chief Jesus Verzosa said that in their last “validation process," 68 groups had already been confirmed as PAGs: 25 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and 43 elsewhere. Verzosa said that the total number could reach as high as 170, as they were “still verifying" 102 other private groups suspected of possessing firearms: 77 groups within the ARMM, and 25 groups in other regions. Lt. Col. Romeo Brawner, who was then AFP spokesman, said the 68 validated PAGs’ identities could not be revealed until the validation process is completed, since “other groups might say we are being unfair." The problem in counting private armies, however, boils down to definitions. As ICAPA chair Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa said on May 5, as quoted by the Human Rights Watch report: “[Local governments] create civilian armed groups, thereby providing a cloak of legitimacy to the action of these groups who are presumed to be acting in accordance with their official duties, when more often than not they simply do the bidding of their political godfathers." In many parts of the country where professional law enforcers are in short supply, these local militias allied with local politicians provide security and do indeed act as “force multipliers" for government troops battling criminal gangs and rebel armies. That is one vital reason why a sitting President cannot simply abolish so-called private armies. In addition to the risk of creating security vacuums in far-flung provinces, a crackdown will take armed might away from even greater threats against the state. In the case of the Ampatuans, it has been more expedient to treat them as an aberration rather than part of a larger problem that needs to be wiped out. – HS, GMANews.TV